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Introduction 
In December 2006, Carrie Baker walked into her local pharmacy at the 
Kroger’s grocery store in Rome, Georgia.1  A forty-two-year-old mother of 
two, she wanted to purchase the emergency contraceptive Plan B,2 but the 
pharmacist on duty refused to sell it to her.3  Ms. Baker felt hurt, 
embarrassed, and insulted at the refusal.4  In spite of this shocking denial, 
Ms. Baker had no legal recourse against the pharmacist.5  Georgia law 
permitted pharmacists to refuse, for personal reasons, to sell 
contraceptives.6 
Several states away in Illinois, a different legal development was 
taking place, with the law aimed squarely against pharmacists who would 
deny women access to contraceptives.7  An executive rule issued by Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich requires all pharmacies to fill prescriptions for 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Peter Urban, Shays:  Plan B Contraceptive Must Be Sold, CONN. POST, June 7, 
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10624652 ("Last December, Carrie Baker was shocked 
when a pharmacist at her local Kroger’s grocery store in Rome, Ga., refused to sell her Plan 
B."). 
 2. Id.  Emergency contraceptives such as Plan B prevent pregnancy after unprotected 
sex if taken within seventy-two hours after intercourse.  See also Sydney Kokjohn, Note, 
The Imposition of an Age Restriction on Over-the-Counter Access to Plan B Emergency 
Contraception:  Violating Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Exceeding Statutory 
Authority, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 369, 371–72 (2008) (explaining emergency 
contraceptives accomplish this outcome by preventing ovulation, union of the sperm and 
egg, or implantation of the fertilized egg). 
 3. Urban, supra note 1. 
 4. See id. ("[I]t was ‘hurtful,’ ‘embarrassing,’ and ‘insulting’ to have a pharmacist 
deny her emergency contraceptives while willingly selling Viagra to men."). 
 5. See id. ("The pharmacist, however, was within her legal rights.  Georgia law 
allows pharmacists to refuse, for personal reasons, to sell contraceptives."). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 480–81 (2008) (summarizing 
the emergency rule issued by former Illinois Governor Rob Blagojevich requiring 
pharmacies to dispense contraceptives). 
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contraceptives, including Plan B.8  Governor Blagojevich announced that he 
would enforce the rule vigorously,9 to the fear of pharmacist Luke Vander 
Bleek.10  Mr. Vander Bleek is a practicing Catholic who strongly believes 
that life begins at conception.11  As a result, he believes that Plan B, which 
may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, is an abortifacient and refuses 
to stock or to sell it in the pharmacies that he owns.12  To defend against 
being forced to dispense Plan B, Mr. Vander Bleek filed a lawsuit seeking 
declaratory relief that the rule is invalid.13  This lawsuit came at a steep 
price.  According to Mr. Vander Bleek, the rule’s "chilling effect" forced 
him to shutter one of his pharmacies because he could not find a pharmacist 
to staff it, for fear that the pharmacy would lose its license for failing to 
adhere to the rule.14 
Ms. Baker and Mr. Vander Bleek’s stories exemplify the mosaic of 
state laws and regulations governing access to contraceptives.15  Some 
states require pharmacists or pharmacies to dispense properly prescribed 
medication, whereas others allow pharmacists or pharmacies to refuse to 
dispense medications based on conscientious objections.16  The differing 
state solutions reflected by Ms. Baker and Mr. Vander Bleek’s experiences 
reflect efforts either to ensure access to these medicines or to legislate the 
protection of health care providers’ conscientious objections.17 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 481–82 ("[O]n April 13, 2005, the Governor issued a press release 
indicating that he will ‘vigorously defend’ the emergency rule requiring pharmacists to sell 
and fill prescriptions for contraceptives without delay."). 
 10. See id. at 482 (stating that Mr. Vander Bleek filed a motion for a temporary 
restraining order against the rule on September 14, 2005). 
 11. Id. at 478. 
 12. See id. at 478–79 ("He has formed a professional opinion ‘about teratogenic or 
abortifacient drugs and their destruction of what he considers is human life,’ and he believes 
that Plan B has an ‘abortifacient mechanism of action.’"). 
 13. Id. at 477. 
 14. Id. at 484–85. 
 15. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., PHARMACY REFUSALS:  STATE LAWS, 
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES (2009), http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/PharmacyRefusalPolicies 
March2009.pdf (summarizing state laws and regulations governing access to medication, 
which vary from requiring pharmacists or pharmacies to dispense medication to allow 
pharmacist and pharmacy refusals with no protection for patients) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience:  Moral Clashes over 
Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 43 (2008) (noting that 
some states have taken steps directing health care providers to offer emergency 
contraceptives to rape victims and also that other states have legislated the protection of 
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Ms. Baker’s and Mr. Vander Bleek’s stories provide two examples of 
recent clashes over access to emergency contraceptives.  Indeed, whether 
pharmacists may refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives is a highly 
contentious issue, which dominates the broader debate over women’s 
access to all contraceptives.18  Generally, pharmacists who object to 
providing emergency contraceptives hold views similar to Mr. Vander 
Bleek’s position that emergency contraceptives are abortifacients.19  Some 
pharmacists also believe that certain other contraceptives act as 
abortifacients,20 or they object to providing all contraceptives on moral 
grounds other than abortion.21  Reflecting the contours of the debate over 
access to contraceptives, this Note focuses on the issue of access to 
emergency contraceptives. 
Resolving the controversy between women and pharmacists over 
access to emergency contraceptives is difficult because both sides frame 
their arguments in terms of competing rights.22  This Note attempts to 
bridge this divide by arguing that a national level policy solution is needed 
in order to adequately facilitate women’s access to contraceptives while 
simultaneously protecting the consciences of pharmacists.  Part I 
summarizes the current laws and regulations governing access to 
emergency contraceptives.  Part II makes the case for a national policy 
solution, and Part III lays out the framework for this solution.  Based on the 
guidelines set forth in Part III, Part IV examines recently proposed policy 
solutions.  The fourth part argues that none of these proposals adequately 
protects the interests of women and pharmacists.  Part V proposes a policy 
                                                                                                                 
conscientious refusals by pharmacists and pharmacies). 
 18. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 41 (observing that "[r]efusals by individual 
pharmacies and pharmacists to fill prescriptions for emergency contraceptives [like 
Plan B] . . . have dominated news headlines"). 
 19. See infra Part II.B (discussing more thoroughly the foundation of pharmacists’ 
objections to providing emergency contraceptives). 
 20. See Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line:  The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy 
Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 491 (2006) (noting 
the Catholic Church’s official position that emergency contraceptives and some other forms 
of birth control such as IUDs and certain oral contraceptives are abortifacients that act to 
wrongly take a human life). 
 21. Pharmacists may object to birth control methods in general because they believe 
that birth control promotes problems like "promiscuity, divorce, the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases, and other societal woes."  See Rob Stein, ‘Pro-Life’ Drugstores Market 
Beliefs, WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, at A1. 
 22. See HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE:  AN 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE 39 (2008) ("[B]oth sides of the debate claim important rights 
that defeat those of the other simply by virtue of the fact that they are rights."). 
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solution designed to protect access to emergency contraceptives and 
pharmacists who object to providing them. 
I.   Introduction to the Current Laws and Regulations Governing Access to 
Emergency Contraceptives 
A.  History 
Under their police powers, individual states have broad authority to 
promulgate rules governing the conduct of pharmacies and pharmacists.23  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,24 decriminalizing 
abortion,25 most states and the federal government enacted conscientious 
refusal clauses, aimed mainly at protecting health care providers who did 
not want to assist in abortion and sterilization procedures.26  At that time, 
only a few states’ clauses covered refusals arising from the dispensation of 
contraceptives.27 
Several events in the 1990’s changed the legal landscape inspired by 
Roe v. Wade, and provoked the current laws and regulations governing 
access to emergency contraceptives.  During this time, managed care grew 
dramatically, which led many Catholic hospitals that oppose providing 
emergency contraceptives to assume significant roles in health care 
delivery.28  Following the advent of the popular male impotence drug 
Viagra, controversy exploded over insurance companies’ decisions to cover 
that drug while maintaining their long-standing policies of denying 
coverage for prescription oral contraceptives.29  Finally, the Food and Drug 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See id. at 28 ("Under their police powers, states have broad authority to regulate 
the conduct of the medical profession, including the elements of training and capacity 
required for permission to engage in the practice of medicine."). 
 24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 25.  Id. 
 26. See Smearman, supra note 20, at 476–78 (tracing the advent of health care 
provider refusal laws from the federal Church Amendment to the ones that most states 
subsequently enacted). 
 27. Id. at 477. 
 28. See id at 484–90 (tracing the growth of religiously-affiliated hospitals and state 
efforts to mandate the provision of emergency contraceptives to rape victims). 
 29. See id. at 481–84 (describing insurance companies’ policies following the release 
of Viagra and the federal and state equity laws that responded to the controversy over these 
policies).  The federal solution provided federal employees with coverage for all FDA-
approved methods of contraception, with exceptions for insurers that objected based on their 
religious beliefs.  Id. at 482.  At the state level, twenty-two states have adopted laws 
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Administration’s (FDA) approval of the prescription emergency 
contraceptive Plan B in 1998 catalyzed lawmakers’ opposed to 
contraceptives to draft a "‘second wave of refusal clauses.’"30  Each of these 
developments pitted opponents to emergency contraceptives against those 
who sought them.  These events inspired today’s state laws and regulations 
governing access to emergency contraceptives.31 
B.   Emergency Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Role in Providing 
Them 
Pharmacists are the "de facto gatekeepers" of emergency 
contraceptives, even though one contraceptive, Plan B, is most likely safe 
for use by women of all ages and is now available to some as an over-the-
counter drug.32  In August 2006, the FDA approved the over-the-counter 
disposal of Plan B for women eighteen and older.33  As a condition of this 
access, the FDA requires Plan B to be sold only in facilities staffed with 
health care professionals such as pharmacies.34  Crucially, the FDA also 
requires health care providers to keep Plan B behind the counter and to 
require proof of age for purchase.35  The FDA’s policy places pharmacists 
"squarely between the patient and the drug."36 
The age restrictions against disposing Plan B are politically 
controversial, but they currently remain in effect for young women sixteen 
and under.  In January 2005, a group of adolescent girls and the 
reproductive rights group MAP Conspiracy filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the FDA’s 
denial of their request to make Plan B available over the counter to all age 
                                                                                                                 
requiring private insurance companies to provide coverage for prescription contraceptives if 
they cover other prescriptions.  Id. at 483. 
 30. Id. at 477 (noting the link between the controversies over emergency 
contraceptives and insurance coverage of contraceptives and the rise of new laws and 
regulations extending the reach of conscience clauses to cover situations involving these 
medications). 
 31. See id. at 477–81 (summarizing the development of laws allowing pharmacists to 
refuse to dispense contraceptives and of laws directing pharmacists to dispense 
contraceptives). 
 32. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 47 (observing that pharmacists remain "de facto 
gatekeepers of Plan B" due to the FDA’s policy on access to Plan B). 
 33. Id. at 46. 
 34. Kokjohn, supra  note 2, at 377. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Wilson, supra note 17, at 47. 
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groups.37  Vacating the FDA’s decision, Judge Edward R. Korman ordered 
the agency to approve the over-the-counter use of Plan B for women 
seventeen and older under the same conditions originally permitting Plan 
B’s distribution to women eighteen and older.38  The court found that the 
FDA arbitrarily and capriciously denied the plaintiffs’ request to change the 
Plan B dispensation guidelines.39  The decision cited two reasons in support 
of the holding: 
The FDA . . . [demonstrated] a lack of good faith regarding its decision 
on the Plan B [over the counter status] switch application.  This lack of 
good faith is evidenced by, among other things, (1) repeated and 
unreasonable delays, pressure emanating from the [Bush] White House, 
and the obvious connection between the confirmation process of two 
FDA Commissioners and the timing of the FDA’s decisions; and (2) 
significant departures from the FDA’s normal procedures and policies in 
the review of the Plan B switch applications as compared to the review 
of other switch applications in the past 10 years.40 
One finding in support of the court’s decision particularly underscores 
the politically-charged nature of the debate over access to Plan B.  The 
court found that "political and ideological factors played a determinative 
role in the nomination and selection process for membership" on one of the 
committees empanelled to advise the FDA on how to respond to the over-
the-counter status switch applications.41  The court emphasized that such 
action did not advance the FDA’s "obligation to examine the safety and 
effectiveness of . . . [Plan B’s] use in self-medication."42 
The court acknowledged that nearly all of the FDA’s scientific review 
staff concluded that women of all ages could use Plan B without a 
prescription safely and effectively.43  The court declined to substitute its 
own judgment for the FDA’s judgment, so it did not grant the full relief 
sought by the plaintiffs.44  The court, however, did conclude that no 
evidence justified denying seventeen year olds over the counter access to 
the medication.45  Following the court’s decision, on April 22, 2009, the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 579, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 38. Id. at 550. 
 39. Id. at 523. 
 40. Id. at 544. 
 41. Id. at 527. 
 42. Id. at 547 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 353(b)(1), 355(d)). 
 43. Id. at 523. 
 44. Id. at 543. 
 45. Id. at 550.  The FDA’s own findings acknowledged as much, concluding that "the 
570 16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. SOC. JUST. 563 (2010) 
FDA implemented the Eastern District of New York’s order by issuing a 
statement that it would allow Plan B’s sale to women seventeen and older 
without a prescription.46 
Since the Eastern District of New York’s 2009 decision, an alternative 
to Plan B has been approved for commercial use.47  In August 2010, the 
FDA approved ella, which is available only by prescription.48  The drug’s 
ability to prevent pregnancy after unprotected sex for a longer time period 
than Plan B and chemical similarity to "abortion pill" RU-486 are 
controversial.49  However, the drug may be legally obtained through the 
online pharmacy KwikMed.50  KwikMed does not accept health insurance, 
though.51  Without the option of using health insurance, some women may 
find that purchasing ella online is prohibitively expensive given that they 
would be purchasing it on short notice.52  Additionally, a significant number 
                                                                                                                 
‘scientific data [is] sufficient to support the safe use of Plan B as an OTC product . . . for 
women who are 17 years of age and older.’"  Id.  The court rejected as "simply untenable," 
the FDA’s explanation that the difficulty of enforcing the age-based restriction necessitated 
keeping the eighteen-and-older age requirement.  Id.  The FDA presented no evidence that 
the age restriction would be unenforceable if set at age seventeen.  Id. 
 46. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Updated FDA Action on Plan B 
(Levonorgestrel) Tablets (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press 
Announcements/2009/ucm149568.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 47.  See Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d 579, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (observing that at the 
time, Plan B was the only contraceptive drug available in the United States). 
 48.  Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves EllaTM Tablets for 
Prescription Emergency Contraception (Aug. 13, 2010),  http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
NewsRoom/PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 49. Posting of Rob Stein to THE CHECKUP, voices.washingtonpost.com/checkup/ 
2010/12/controversial_contraceptive_av.html (Dec. 1, 2010, 09:57 EST) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 50.  Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. – December 1, 2010, Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
Launches Ella Emergency Contraceptive, STANDARD & POOR’S DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 23967848.  Plan B is available online, as well.  E.g., Buy Plan B 
Online, DRUGSTORE.COM, http://www.drugstore.com/qxp161395/plan_b_one_step/emer 
gency_contraceptive_must_be_17_or_over_to_purchase_without_a_prescription.htm (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2010, 23:00 EST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice).  The considerations supporting the need to ensure access to ella at 
brick-and-mortar stores apply equally to Plan B. 
 51. The FAQ’s of Buying Medicine Online, KWIKMED, https://www.kwikmed.com/_ 
faqs.asp#8 (last visited Dec. 9, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 52. The price of ella is $55, plus shipping.  Ella (Ulipristal Acetate) – Buy Ella Online 
from KwikMed, KWIKMED, https://www.kwikmed.com/ella.asp (last visited Dec. 9, 2010) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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of women may not know about KwikMed, trust an online pharmacy, or 
have reliable internet access.  Problems like these could easily prevent 
many women from ordering the drug in time to receive it during the short 
period when it is effective.53  Women will still need to obtain emergency 
contraceptives at traditional brick-and-mortar pharmacies.  Pharmacists’ 
continued control over access to emergency contraceptives will remain an 
important issue.54 
C.  Current State Policies 
Thirty-two states have no regulations or laws targeting access to Plan 
B,55 despite controversy over access to the medication.  These states’ laws 
and regulations may implicitly prohibit conscientious refusals to provide 
contraceptives.56  The states permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense 
medications for medically valid reasons, such as a dangerous drug 
interaction, or for legally valid reasons, such as a failure to produce a valid 
prescription.57  By failing to excuse objections based on religious, moral, or 
personal beliefs, these states presumably bar conscience-based refusals.58 
In the absence of guidelines regarding the provision of emergency 
contraceptives, pharmacists still may have the flexibility to refuse drugs for 
reasons of conscience.  An incident in Ohio, a state with no set policy on 
pharmacist refusals,59 demonstrates why this is true.60  In that state, a Wal-
                                                                                                                 
 53. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing how emergency contraceptives are effective for 
only three to five days after unprotected sexual intercourse). 
 54. Stein, supra note 49.  Indeed, the litigation over Plan B’s age restrictions in the 
case before Judge Korman has not ceased.  On November 16, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a 
motion for civil contempt, accusing the FDA of contempt of court for failing to reconsider 
the age restriction for the drug.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Civil Contempt, Tummino v. Hamburg, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (2009) (CV-05-0366), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdfs/Motionforcontempt.pdf (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  As of the date 
this Note went to press, Judge Korman had yet to rule on the motion. 
 55. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 1. 
 56. See JILL MORRISON & GRETCHEN BORCHELT, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., DON’T 
TAKE "NO" FOR AN ANSWER:  A GUIDE TO PHARMACY REFUSAL LAWS, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES 4 (2007), http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/DontTakeNo2007.pdf (noting that in states 
without specific policies addressing access to contraceptives, pharmacists only may refuse to 
dispense medications for medically or legally valid reasons) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 1 (identifying Ohio as one of the 
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Mart pharmacist refused to provide Plan B to a couple after a "contraceptive 
mishap."61  The pharmacist relied on Wal-Mart’s policy that allows any 
employee who does not feel comfortable dispensing a product to refer 
customers to another pharmacist, pharmacy worker, or sales associate.62  
State Governor Ted Strickland disapproved of the pharmacist’s actions, but 
at the same time, stated that he had no specific plans concerning the 
incident.63  Based on the state’s present laws and regulations, Governor 
Strickland could not have accomplished much, anyway.  Ohio’s pharmacy 
laws and regulations provide no clear guidelines addressing the issue of 
pharmacist conscientious refusals.64 
                                                                                                                 
states where pharmacists have an implicit duty to provide medications to patients). 
 60. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 47 (using the example discussed in this paragraph to 
point out how the FDA’s over the counter policy on Plan B gives pharmacists the power to 
exercise their gatekeeper role over it and deny access to this drug). 
 61. Misti Crane, Some Still Refuse to Dispense Plan B, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 
2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 815433. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Pharmacists in Ohio have much professional discretion over the decision to 
dispense a particular medication.  Ohio defines the practice of pharmacy as "providing 
pharmacist care requiring specialized knowledge, judgment, and skill derived from the 
principles of biological, chemical, behavioral, social, pharmaceutical, and clinical sciences."  
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.01(B) (2009).  As a result, Ohio pharmacists may presumably 
draw upon their understanding of when life begins in refusing Plan B—assuming they relate 
their conclusion on when life begins to the biological process of fertilization.  The State’s 
enumerated list of activities that constitute "pharmacist care" does not explicitly preclude or 
condone such decisions.  The list  includes interpreting prescriptions, dispensing drugs and 
drug therapy related devices, compounding drugs, counseling patients with regard to their 
drug therapy, performing drug regimen reviews, discussing a patients’ drug regimens with 
their prescribers, and advising patients and those treating them with regard to the patients’ 
drug therapy.  § 4729.01(B)(1)–(7).  In fact, Ohio’s regulation on dispensing drugs only 
requires that a pharmacist or pharmacy intern dispense medications in accordance with State 
law.  OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4729:5-25(A) (2009).  Finally, Ohio does not single out  
conscience-based medication refusals as protected activity or as sanctionable unprofessional 
conduct.  The State administrative code recognizes the following five activities as 
unprofessional conduct: 
(1) Advertising or displaying signs that promote dangerous drugs to the public in 
a manner that is false or misleading; (2) Except as provided in section 4729.281 
of the Revised Code, the sale of any drug for which a prescription is required, 
without having received a prescription for the drug; (3) Knowingly dispensing 
medication pursuant to false or forged prescriptions; (4) Knowingly failing to 
maintain complete and accurate records of all dangerous drugs received or 
dispensed in compliance with federal laws and regulations and state laws and 
rules; (5) Obtaining any remuneration by fraud, misrepresentation, or deception. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.16(C) (2009). 
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In contrast to states with no particular pharmacist refusal policy, 
California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, and 
Washington have policies directing pharmacists or pharmacies to provide 
legally available medication.65  Of these states, California is the only one 
that requires both pharmacists and pharmacies to dispense medications.66  
California law specifically states that no pharmacist shall obstruct a 
patient’s access to a legally prescribed medication.67  However, the law in 
California does attempt to protect conscientiously objecting pharmacists, 
provided that they notify their employer in advance of their objections to 
any drugs or class of drugs.68  A pharmacist may decline to provide a drug, 
though, if the pharmacist’s employer can provide a reasonable 
accommodation of the pharmacist’s refusal without imposing an undue 
hardship on the employer.69  In accommodating an objecting pharmacist, 
pharmacies in California have the duty to ensure that patients have timely 
access to the medications that the objecting pharmacist refuses to 
dispense.70 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada place the duty to dispense 
medications on pharmacists.71  For example, Maine permits pharmacists to 
refuse to dispense a drug only for non-conscience based reasons, such as 
the failure of the patient to present a valid prescription.72  Similarly, 
Nevada’s administrative regulations allow pharmacists to decline to fill a 
prescription only if filling it is unlawful or potentially harmful to the 
patient’s health, or if the prescription is fraudulent or not for a legitimate 
medical purpose.73  The Massachusetts Board of Pharmacy74 has set forth a 
                                                                                                                 
 65. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 66. Id. 
 67. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733(a) (West 2007). 
 68. Id. § 733(b)(3). 
 69. Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(l) (West 2004)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 72. See 02-392 ME. CODE R. ch. 19, § 11 (West 2009) (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
32, § 13795 (West 2008)).  Section 13795 grants pharmacists the discretion to refuse to fill 
prescriptions or to dispense drugs for a variety of non-conscience based reasons, such as if 
the pharmacist believes that the patient will use a drug to manufacture methamphetamine or 
that the prescription is invalid or inappropriate.  Id. 
 73. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 639.753(1) (West 2008). 
 74. The Massachusetts Board of Pharmacy is empowered by law to enforce the laws 
relating to pharmacy and to create and to enforce the rules of professional conduct in 
pharmacy.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 42A (West 2003) (setting forth the Board 
of Pharmacy’s enforcement powers for carrying out the provisions of law relating to the drug 
and pharmacy business and for creating and enforcing the rules of professional conduct). 
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policy that pharmacists are required to fill all valid prescriptions, including 
those for emergency contraceptives.75  These three states do not recognize 
in any way pharmacists’ conscientious objections to filling prescriptions. 
Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington place the duty to dispense 
medications on pharmacies.76  Illinois has a targeted regulation that requires 
all pharmacies to dispense contraceptives.77  If an Illinois pharmacy stocks 
contraceptives, then it must use its best efforts to maintain an adequate 
stock of emergency contraceptives.78  If a pharmacist objects to disposing 
emergency contraceptives, then the Illinois regulation requires pharmacies 
to inquire whether another pharmacist on duty would object to providing 
the drug.79  If no such pharmacist is available, then the pharmacy still must 
provide the emergency contraception by contacting an off-site pharmacy or 
non-objecting pharmacist.80  Pharmacies have the responsibility of ensuring 
either that a non-objecting pharmacist is on duty or that an off-site non-
objecting pharmacist is available.81 
In contrast, New Jersey and Washington have broader rules requiring 
pharmacies to dispense all drugs.82  Pharmacies in New Jersey and 
Washington must assist patients in gaining access to a drug if the pharmacy 
is out of stock or does not carry it.83  However, unlike Illinois, neither New 
                                                                                                                 
 75. MORRISON & BORCHELT, supra note 56, at 5 (citing a letter issued by the 
Massachusetts Board of Pharmacy stating its policy that pharmacists are required to fill all 
valid prescriptions and that no class of drugs is exempt from the general requirement of 
dispensation). 
 76. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 77. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j)(1) (West 2009). 
 78. § 1330.91(j)(2). 
 79. § 1330.91(j)(3)(A). 
 80. § 1330.91(j)(3)(B). 
 81. § 1330.91(j)(4). 
 82. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14–67.1(a) (West 2007) ("A pharmacy practice site has a 
duty to properly fill lawful prescription drugs or devices that it carries for customers, without 
undue delay, despite any conflicts of employees to filling a prescription and dispensing a 
particular prescription drug or device due to sincerely held moral, philosophical or religious 
beliefs."); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1) (West 2008) ("Pharmacies have a duty to 
deliver lawfully prescribed drugs or devices to patients and to distribute drugs and devices 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for restricted distribution by 
pharmacies, or provide a therapeutically equivalent drug or device in a timely manner . . . ."). 
 83. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14–67.1(b)–(c) (requiring pharmacies either to obtain the 
drug using expedited ordering procedures or to locate another pharmacy with the drug in 
stock that is reasonably accessible to the patient); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1), 
(3) (requiring pharmacies to deliver the drug or provide a "therapeutically equivalent 
drug . . . in a timely manner consistent with reasonable expectations for filling the 
prescription" or to provide a "timely alternative for appropriate therapy which, consistent 
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Jersey nor Washington provides detailed procedures to pharmacies for 
handling situations involving pharmacists who object to providing Plan B.84 
States that impose duties to dispense medications facilitate women’s 
access to contraceptives.  However, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada 
offer no protection to pharmacists’ conscientious objection to providing 
these medications.  And unlike Illinois, New Jersey’s and Washington’s 
rules directing pharmacies to dispense all medications offer little guidance 
in how to address the concerns of pharmacists’ conscientious objection to 
providing contraceptives while simultaneously serving the needs of women 
seeking those medications. 
Other states do not impose duties to dispense medications but still 
include some measures to protect women’s access to Plan B.  Alabama, 
Delaware, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas 
allow pharmacist or pharmacy refusals but prohibit obstructions against 
access to medications and refusals to transfer or to refer customers.85  Of 
the states in this group, Alabama, North Carolina, and Texas direct their 
policies solely toward pharmacists by requiring them to meaningfully refer 
or transfer a patient’s request for medication.86  The pharmacy boards of 
these states have interpreted their professional obligations to require an 
objecting pharmacist to provide a meaningful referral or transfer to a patient 
seeking contraceptives.87  These opinions carry the force of law because 
these states’ laws grant the boards the power to enforce the laws governing 
the pharmacy business in those states.88 
In Delaware, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, pharmacists and 
pharmacies have duties to prevent the obstruction of a patient seeking 
                                                                                                                 
with customary pharmacy practice, may include obtaining the drug or device").  On top of its 
pharmacies’ duty to dispense medications, Washington requires pharmacies to maintain a 
stock of contraceptives, so long as doing so reflects the pharmaceutical needs of its patients.  
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-150(1) (West 2008) ("The pharmacy must maintain at 
all times a representative assortment of drugs in order to meet the pharmaceutical needs of 
its patients."). 
 84. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14–67.1, and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010, 
with ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j). 
 85. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See ALA. CODE § 34-23-90(a) (2009) (vesting in the Alabama State Board of 
Pharmacy the authority to carry out and to enforce the pharmacy profession); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 90-85.6(a) (West 2008) (granting responsibility for enforcing the laws 
pertaining to pharmacy to the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 
§ 554.001 (Vernon 2008) (giving the Texas State Board of Pharmacy the powers to 
administer and enforce the rules and laws governing the practice of pharmacy). 
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contraceptives.89  These states prohibit pharmacists from interfering with a 
patient’s access to medications.90  Oregon adds the requirement that 
pharmacists must provide a meaningful referral or transfer of prescription to 
a patient seeking contraceptives.91  As for the pharmacies in these four 
states, they must ensure that patients have timely access to the medications 
they seek.92  These states also rely on pharmacy board statements that carry 
the force of law.93 
Compared to the states imposing duties to dispense medications, these 
states provide more balance between the interests of women in obtaining 
contraceptives and pharmacists who may have conscientious objections to 
providing those medications.  Even though pharmacists may object to 
providing these medications, either they or the pharmacies where they work 
must provide women access to the drugs. 
Finally, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota have 
sweeping statutes or regulations that permit pharmacists or a whole host of 
institutions to refuse to dispense medications.94  The main difference 
between these states is the number of types of providers who are allowed to 
refuse dispensing Plan B.95 
Georgia and South Dakota allow only pharmacists to refuse the 
provision of a medication.96  Georgia protects pharmacist refusals to fill 
prescriptions based on ethical or moral beliefs by specifically considering 
                                                                                                                 
 89. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2.  See also 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 
(2009) (setting forth in the Pennsylvania Code the State Board of Pharmacy’s policy 
statement on matters of conscience allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions yet 
directing them not to abandon or neglect a patient). 
 90. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2501 (2009) (setting forth the Delaware Board of 
Pharmacy’s objectives of overseeing the pharmacy trade and of maintaining professional 
standards in pharmacy); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6804 (McKinney 2009) (granting the New York 
Board of Pharmacy the power to regulate the practice of pharmacy); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 689.135 (2008) (giving the Oregon Board of Pharmacy the duties and power to regulate 
pharmacy in the state); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 390-6(k) (West  2008) (providing the 
Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy the power and duty to regulate the practice of 
pharmacy). 
 94. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 95. See id. (identifying Georgia and South Dakota as states allowing pharmacists to 
refuse provision of contraceptives, and Arkansas and Mississippi as states permitting even 
institutions like pharmacies to refuse to dispense contraceptives). 
 96. Id. 
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such refusals not to be unprofessional conduct.97  As a result, the Georgia 
Board of Pharmacy may not subject refusing pharmacists to disciplinary 
actions.98  South Dakota tailors its refusal statute to allow pharmacist 
refusals only when "there is reason to believe that the medication would be 
used to:  (1) Cause an abortion; or (2) Destroy an unborn child."99  This 
statute would protect pharmacists, such as Mr. Vander Bleek, who object to 
giving out emergency contraceptives on the basis of their beliefs that such 
medications are abortifacients.100  In contrast to Georgia, South Dakota 
provides bulletproof protection to such pharmacists by exempting them 
from any claim of damages or disciplinary action—even any such action by 
their employers—that may arise from their refusals.101 
Arkansas and Mississippi extend the broad protections found in 
Georgia and South Dakota beyond pharmacists.102  In Arkansas, most health 
care bodies—from private institutions and physicians, including their 
agents and employees, to employees of public institutions acting under 
directions of a physician—are permitted to refuse to provide contraceptive 
procedures, supplies, and information based on religious or conscientious 
objections.103  Similarly, Mississippi allows health care providers, health 
care institutions, and health care payers, such as insurance companies, to 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See GA. CODE ANN. § 480-5-.03(n) (2008) ("It shall not be considered 
unprofessional conduct for any pharmacist to refuse to fill any prescription based on his/her 
professional judgment or ethical or moral beliefs."). 
 98. See id. § 480-5-.03(o) (setting forth that "[v]iolation of [the Code of Professional 
Conduct] may subject the violator to suspension or revocation of any license issued to 
him/her by the Board and/or public reprimand, fines, probation, letters of concern or other 
disciplinary actions deemed appropriate by the Board"). 
 99. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2008). 
 100. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 478 (2008) (summarizing Mr. 
Vander Bleek’s understanding of how the emergency contraceptive Plan B works as an 
abortifacient). 
 101. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 ("No such refusal to dispense medication 
pursuant to this section may be the basis for any claim for damages against the pharmacist or 
the pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary, recriminatory, or 
discriminatory action against the pharmacist.").  Indeed, South Dakota law even protects the 
pharmacy of the refusing pharmacist from liability for damages.  Id. 
 102. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2 (noting that other health care 
providers, like pharmacies, are protected too). 
 103. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2009), which provides: 
No private institution [like a pharmacy] or physician, nor any agent or employee 
[like a pharmacist] of the institution or physician, nor any employee of a public 
institution acting under directions of a physician, shall be prohibited from 
refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information when 
the refusal is based upon religious or conscientious objection. 
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abstain from providing health care services—such as dispensing 
contraceptives—that violate their consciences.104  The sweeping provisions 
of Arkansas and Mississippi law cover pharmacists, pharmacies, and other 
health care providers.105  These laws extend the liability protections found 
in South Dakota and exempt pharmacists and pharmacies in Arkansas and 
Mississippi from liability for their refusals.106 
With no provisions directing pharmacists or pharmacies to assist 
patients in gaining access to medicine in the face of health care providers’ 
conscientious refusals, these four states do not facilitate women’s access to 
Plan B.  Indeed, the decisions of these states to exempt health care 
providers from liability for conscientious objection make it impossible for 
women to seek legal recourse for consequences stemming from refusals to 
provide emergency contraceptives. 
II.  A National Policy Solution Is Necessary 
A national level solution is necessary to resolve the conflict between 
women seeking contraceptives and providers who conscientiously object to 
dispensing them.  The argument for a national solution stems from the need 
to ensure protection of the interests of both women and pharmacists, 
wherever they may be located.  On the one hand, a national policy would 
advance important women’s health interests in obtaining contraceptives.  
This kind of solution also would democratize women’s access to 
contraceptives, such that the ease of obtaining them is not contingent on the 
state where a woman lives.  On the other hand, pharmacists are concerned 
about whether they are able adhere to their conscientious objections against 
dispensing contraceptives while continuing to serve as professionals.  A 
national policy solution accommodating this interest would ensure that all 
pharmacists’ consciences are protected, no matter where they practice. 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5-9 (West 2008) (allowing health care providers 
[like pharmacists], institutions [like pharmacies], and payers to decline to participate in 
providing "health care services" like the provision of contraceptives). 
 105. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5-9 
(West 2008).  
 106. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2009) ("No such institution, employee, 
agent, or physician shall be held liable for the refusal [to provide contraceptive procedures, 
supplies, and information]."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5-7 (West 2008) (relieving 
pharmacists and pharmacies from civil, criminal, or administrative liability for declining to 
participate in health care services in violation of their consciences). 
CONCEIVING PLAN B 579 
A.  How a National Policy Solution Would Assist Women 
1.  Women Have an Important Interest in Controlling the Timing of Their 
Pregnancies 
Women have a vital health interest in controlling their pregnancies.  
Millions of women use contraceptives to accomplish this.  As of 2008, the 
United States had approximately sixty-two million women of reproductive 
age.107  Sixty-two percent of them are currently using some form of 
contraceptive.108  Of all contraceptive means, the drug version dispensed by 
pharmacists is the number one method.109  It is the most popular method 
because it provides a "steady form" of birth control.110  Indeed, oral 
contraceptives are crucial to women’s health care needs, because many 
women use them to time their pregnancies.  Forty-three million women of 
reproductive age are sexually active and do not want to become pregnant.111  
The typical U.S. woman wants only two children; to achieve this goal, she 
must use contraceptives for approximately three decades.112  Moreover, 
preventing unintended pregnancies is vital to women and society in 
general.113  Such pregnancies often lead to tragic societal consequences, 
such as single parenthood, the failure of women to finish their educations, 
and abortions.114 
                                                                                                                 
 107. GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON CONTRACEPTIVE USE 1 (2008), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id.  About thirty percent of U.S. women who practice contraception use the 
oral pharmaceutical contraceptive, the "pill."  Id.  This statistic means that over 11.5 million 
women in the U.S. use the pill.  Id. 
 110. See Holly Teliska, Recent Development:  Obstacles to Access:  How Pharmacist 
Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 
20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 233 (2005) (noting that oral contraceptives provide 
a steady form of contraception that lowers pregnancy risks). 
 111. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 107, at 1 ("43 million women of reproductive 
age, or 7 in 10, are sexually active and do not want to become pregnant, but could become 
pregnant if they or their partners fail to use a contraceptive method."). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Erica S. Mellick, Time for Plan B:  Increasing Access to Emergency 
Contraception and Minimizing Conflicts of Conscience, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 402, 
404 (2006) (arguing that that timely access to emergency contraception is crucial for 
American women and general public health and noting, for example, the statistic on how 
long women should use birth control). 
 114. See id. at 403 (observing that "[m]any societal problems can be traced back to 
unwanted pregnancy:  teenage pregnancy, single parenthood, incomplete education of 
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Many women in need of birth control are already economically 
vulnerable.115  Approximately 17.5 million women in need of 
contraceptives are economically disadvantaged and likely to need 
government support in gaining access to these medicines.116  In 2006, over 
nine million women received publicly supported contraceptive care.117  
Seven million of these women received care from publicly funded family 
planning centers, which receive federal funding from Title X and 
Medicaid.118  Over two million women received publically supported 
contraceptive care through Medicaid.119 
Emergency contraceptives constitute an especially vital form of birth 
control.120  They have major potential to curb unwanted pregnancies and 
abortions.121  These pharmaceutical products reduce the pregnancy risk for 
a woman who has had unprotected intercourse between approximately 
sixty-six and seventy-five percent.122  However, emergency contraceptives 
must be taken within five days after unprotected sex to be effective.123  
                                                                                                                 
women, welfare dependency, poverty, lack of prenatal care, substance abuse in early 
pregnancy, low birth weight, infant mortality, and child abuse.").  Unwanted pregnancy also 
may lead to abortions, with attendant health risks that could make the unwanted pregnancy 
deadly.  Id. 
 115. See Teliska, supra note 110, at 233 (concluding that low-income women 
predominantly rely on oral contraceptives to meet their family planning needs). 
 116. GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON PUBLICLY FUNDED CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ fb_contraceptive_serv.pdf (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 117. Id. at 2. 
 118. See id. at 1–2 (showing public funding sources for family planning client services 
and noting the number of women receiving publicly subsidized care from publicly supported 
family planning centers). 
 119. See id. at  2 (noting that "[m]ore than two million women were Medicaid enrollees 
who received contraceptive services from private physicians in 2006"). 
 120. See Mellick, supra note 113, at 403–05 (arguing that not having access to 
emergency contraceptives leads to unintended pregnancies, which have negative 
consequences, such as poverty, and that having access to emergency contraceptives is 
necessary based on the crucial role birth control plays in women’s health). 
 121. See Heather Boonstra, Emergency Contraception:  The Need to Increase Public 
Awareness, 5 THE GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL’Y, Oct. 2002, at 3, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/4/gr050403.pdf (urging that the widespread use of 
emergency contraceptives could reduce the number of abortions and unwanted pregnancies 
in the United States significantly) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 122. If taken properly, the effectiveness of Plan B (levonorgestrel) at preventing 
pregnancy is approximately seventy-five percent.  Id.  The effectiveness of ella at preventing 
pregnancy, if taken properly, is about sixty-six percent.  Stein, supra note 49. 
 123. See Boonstra, supra note 128, at 3 (explaining that Plan B must be taken within 
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Every year, three million pregnancies in the United States are unintended.124  
More than half of these end in abortions.125  Widespread use of emergency 
contraceptives has the potential to reduce unintended pregnancies and 
abortions significantly.126 
2.  Current Pharmacy Disposal Laws Do Not Provide Women Sufficient 
Protection 
The current mosaic of state laws governing pharmacists do not provide 
sufficient protection to women.  The majority of states do not have policies 
protecting women from pharmacist refusals to provide medications.  Only 
fourteen states require either pharmacists or pharmacies to dispense 
medications or to ensure in some way that women obtain the drugs they 
need.127  Thirty-two states do not have policies on conscientious drug 
refusals.128  These states’ regulations imply a duty to dispense medications 
in the absence of legally proscribed circumstances of dispensation, such as 
when a harmful drug interaction could occur.129  Women may not be 
protected in these states because pharmacists still may refuse to provide 
contraceptives to them.130  Four states allow medication refusals based on 
                                                                                                                 
seventy-two hours of unprotected intercourse).  In contrast, ella may prevent pregnancy if 
taken up to five days after unprotected intercourse.  Stein, supra note 49. 
 124. See id. (estimating that "[a]bout half of the 6.3 million pregnancies every year in 
the United States are unintended"). 
 125. See id. ("[A]nd more than half of those [unintended pregnancies] end in 
abortion."). 
 126. See id. (estimating that "1.7 million unintended pregnancies could be avoided, and 
the number of abortions each year could be cut by as much as half"). 
 127. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 1 (summarizing the fact that 
seven states "explicitly require pharmacists or pharmacies to ensure that valid prescriptions 
are filled [and that seven others] have polices that prohibit a pharmacist from obstructing 
patient access to medication or from refusing to transfer or refer prescriptions to another 
pharmacy"). 
 128. This number equals the total number of states, less the fourteen states with some 
policy facilitating women’s access to drugs and those four states with policies protecting 
drug refusals with no concomitant protection for women.  Id. 
 129. See MORRISON & BORCHELT, supra note 56, at 4 (explaining that by "omitting 
religious, moral or personal beliefs from the enumerated reasons for refusals, most state 
pharmacy laws implicitly prohibit such refusals"). 
 130. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing a pharmacist’s refusal to 
provide emergency contraceptives in Ohio, even though it is one of the states listed as 
having no set pharmacist refusal policy). 
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conscience with no protection for the patient.131  Because only a minority of 
states protect women’s access to contraceptives, millions of women have 
uncertain access to Plan B. 
Rural areas magnify the challenges, especially where the law already 
may impede women’s ability to obtain these drugs.132  Mississippi and 
South Dakota are two states with policies permitting refusal to dispense 
without patient protections.133  Both states, especially South Dakota, have 
low population densities.134  In both, dozens of communities have only one 
pharmacy.135  Further compounding the problem is the fact that many 
women in need of contraceptive services in these states have low 
incomes.136  Low-income women have fewer transportation options, further 
hindering their access to emergency contraceptives.137  Mississippi and 
                                                                                                                 
 131. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 132. See Teliska, supra note 110, at 232 (considering specifically the low-population 
states of Mississippi and South Dakota to argue how their conscientious refusal polices are 
"particularly dangerous to women living in those states"). 
 133. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 134. Mississippi has a population density of approximately 60.6 persons per square 
mile.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS:  MISSISSIPPI (2009), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28000.html (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  The average population density in the United 
States is approximately 79.6 persons per square mile.  Id.  South Dakota has a much lower 
population density of approximately 9.9 persons per square mile.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS:  SOUTH DAKOTA (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/46000.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 135. Mississippi has forty-three communities with only one independently owned 
pharmacy.  RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MISSISSIPPI COMMUNITIES WITH ONLY ONE 
PHARMACY, INDEPENDENTLY OWNED (2007), http://www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/ 
statepharm/Mississippi.pdf.  Three of these communities are ones where the nearest retail 
pharmacy is located ten or more miles away.  Id.  South Dakota has thirty-nine communities 
with only one independently owned pharmacy.  RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SOUTH 
DAKOTA COMMUNITIES WITH ONLY ONE PHARMACY, INDEPENDENTLY OWNED (2007), 
http://www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/statepharm/South%20Dakota.pdf.  Thirty-three of 
these communities are located in areas ten or more miles away from another retail pharmacy.  
Id. 
 136. See Teliska, supra note 110, at 244–47 (noting that Mississippi and South Dakota 
have high percentages of low-income women of child bearing age in need of publicly funded 
contraceptive services). 
 137. See id. at 244 (observing in the context of Mississippi that low-income women in 
rural states have "fewer options when it comes to transportation and choice of pharmacies").  
The author also notes that South Dakota’s sparsely populated counties face "economic 
hardships that limit opportunities for travel and time needed to search for a friendly 
pharmacist."  Id. at 246. 
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South Dakota’s refusal laws compound the challenges for rural female 
populations.138 
The challenges to women in gaining access to contraceptives in 
Mississippi and South Dakota illustrate the types of problems faced by 
vulnerable women in rural areas.139  Arkansas is another low-income, low-
population state140 with restrictive drug dispensation laws.141  Dozens of 
communities in Arkansas have only one independently-owned retail 
pharmacy, many of which are located ten miles or more from the next 
one.142  Even high population density states such as Florida,143 which has no 
specific policy on conscientious drug refusals,144 have pockets of rural areas 
served by only one pharmacy.145  A policy addressing women’s access to 
contraceptives would facilitate their health needs in these vulnerable 
communities where the law does not actively promote access to these drugs. 
Finally, even the current comprehensive laws imposing duties to 
dispense contraceptives do not offer sufficient protection to women.  
                                                                                                                 
 138. See id. at 243–44, 246 (concluding that Mississippi’s and South Dakota’s laws 
obstruct women’s access to reproductive health care). 
 139. See id. at 245 (discussing access to contraceptives in rural South Dakota and 
stressing that "[i]n these smaller, more isolated communities, lawmakers have ignored the 
additional constraints on a woman’s ability to find a friendly pharmacist"). 
 140. Arkansas has a population density of approximately 51.3 persons per square mile, 
compared to the national population density of approximately 79.6 persons per square mile.  
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS:  ARKANSAS (2009), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05000.html (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 141. Arkansas is another one of the four states that allow drug dispensation refusals 
with no protection for women.  NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2. 
 142. The state has fifty-three communities with only one independently owned 
pharmacy.  RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ARKANSAS COMMUNITIES WITH ONLY ONE 
PHARMACY, INDEPENDENTLY OWNED (2007), http://www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/ 
statepharm/Arkansas.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice).  The nearest pharmacy relative to twenty-three of these communities is more 
than ten miles away.  Id. 
 143. Florida is relatively highly populated with a population density of approximately 
296.4 persons per square mile versus the national average of approximately 79.6.  U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS:  FLORIDA (2009), http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 144. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 1. 
 145. Despite having major metropolitan areas like Orlando and Miami, Florida has 
twenty-one communities that only have one independently owned pharmacy.  RURAL POLICY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FLORIDA COMMUNITIES WITH ONLY ONE PHARMACY, INDEPENDENTLY 
OWNED (2007), http://www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/statepharm/Florida.pdf (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  People in nine of these 
communities must travel ten or more miles to the next nearest pharmacy.  Id. 
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Ironically, though perhaps not surprisingly, these laws could fail to promote 
the provision of contraceptives in rural areas, where pharmacists may face a 
low demand for certain contraceptive products, such as Plan B.146  They 
therefore may not stock it.147  However, in states with strict duty-to-
dispense rules, the threat of non-compliance could cause small, independent 
pharmacists to consider relocating, due to the financial and emotional costs 
of obeying the rule.148  If a pharmacist relocates, then women in such areas 
are left with no convenient options for care.149 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Business, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) [hereinafter Small Pharmacy Hearings] (testimony 
of J. Michael Patton, Illinois Pharmacists Association) (explaining that "one pharmacy told 
me they had two requests for [Plan B] in about 5 years").  This argument assumes, though, 
that women in these rural areas even would go to their local pharmacy to obtain Plan B in 
the first place.  Obtaining such a medication risks embarrassment over questions regarding 
use of the medication and potential stigma of being turned down based on the pharmacist’s 
objection to the medications.  See Misty Cooper Watt, Comment, Pharmacist Knows Best?  
Enacting Legislation in Oklahoma Prohibiting Pharmacists from Refusing to Provide 
Emergency Contraceptives, 42 TULSA L. REV. 771, 786 (2007), which observes that a 
"woman may be thoroughly embarrassed due to questioning of how she is planning to use 
her medication and why she needs it . . . and may feel stigmatized or humiliated when she is 
turned away from the counter after being judged publicly by a pharmacist as wanting 
‘immoral’ medication."  Id.  These risks are heightened in small communities.  See Chris 
Newton, Teen-Age Pregnancies Rise in Rural West Texas, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, 
July 19, 1998, at A32, available at 1998 WLNR 1204648 (quoting the executive director of 
the Austin chapter of Planned Parenthood, noting, in the context of teen pregnancies, that 
"‘[rural areas] may have to deal with more issues concerning people being embarrassed 
about buying contraceptives . . . [as t]here is less anonymity in a small town’").  Fearing 
such risks, women in small communities may forgo going to their local pharmacies. 
 147. See Small Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 146, at 9 (further noting that the 
pharmacy that had received two Plan B requests over five years chose not to inventory it). 
 148. See id. at 10 (testimony of J. Michael Patton, Illinois Pharmacists Association) 
(explaining that "some pharmacists are questioning the viability of maintaining their practice 
in the State of Illinois" due to the cost of compliance that "has become an emotional as well 
as an economic burden").  According to Mr. Patton, the acts of people testing pharmacists’ 
compliance with the Illinois duty to dispense rule had heightened this risk.  Id. 
 149. In the State of Illinois where the controversy giving rise to Mr. Patton’s testimony 
took place, fifty-seven communities have only one independently owned retail pharmacy.  
RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INST., ILLINOIS COMMUNITIES WITH ONLY ONE PHARMACY, 
INDEPENDENTLY OWNED (2007), http://www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/statepharm/ 
Illinois.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
Twenty-eight of these communities are in areas located more than ten miles from another 
retail pharmacy.  Id.  Closures of pharmacies in these areas would be problematic to women 
living in these areas.  And such closures are not a hypothetical supposition.  In protesting the 
Illinois duty to dispense rule, Mr. Vander Bleek had to close one of his pharmacies.  Morr-
Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill.2d 474, 485 (2008). 
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B.  How a National Policy Solution Would Assist Pharmacists with 
Conscientious Objections to Providing Contraceptives:  Pharmacists’ 
Consciences Are at Stake 
States that either require pharmacists to dispense medicines, or impose 
a duty to refer, place pharmacists’ consciences at risk.  Emergency 
contraceptives pose a special case for pharmacists; they prevent pregnancy 
after unprotected intercourse by stopping ovulation.150  Plan B also may 
prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus.151  For pharmacists 
who believe that life begins at conception, Plan B amounts to an 
abortifacient that takes a human life.152  The absolute duty to dispense 
medications imposed on pharmacists in Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada 
therefore forces pharmacists who object to choose between their 
consciences and the law.153  Even if the law does not specifically require the 
pharmacist to dispense a drug, he or she still may feel under siege in states 
that place a burden on pharmacists to provide a meaningful transfer to 
patients.154  To these pharmacists, transferring a prescription is akin to 
abetting a crime.155 
Pharmacists’ consciences are at stake even in states that do not have 
clear drug dispensation policies.  As is true of women seeking the 
medications, the current set of state laws concerning pharmacists does not 
adequately recognize their interests, either.  One problem is that the current 
laws are unclear.  Just as thirty-two states do not particularly recognize the 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Jennifer E. Spreng, Pharmacists and the "Duty" to Dispense Emergency 
Contraceptives, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 215, 227 (2008). 
 151. See id. at 227–28 (noting that "Plan B could have several post-fertilization 
effects").  The author notes that controversy exists regarding the specifics of Plan B’s post-
fertilization effects, including the important fact that "it is difficult, if not impossible to 
measure Plan B’s post-fertilization effect directly."  Id.  However, the Food and Drug 
Administration and Barr Pharmaceuticals, Plan B’s maker, acknowledge the product’s 
potential post-fertilization effect of preventing attachment of a fertilized egg to the uterus.  
Id. at 227. 
 152. See, e.g., Morr-Fitz, Inc., 231 Ill. 2d at 474 (concerning a pharmacist who believes 
that Plan B is an abortifacient). 
 153. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2 (identifying Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Nevada as the three states that impose absolute duties on pharmacists to 
dispense medications). 
 154. Alabama, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas require pharmacists to provide a 
meaningful transfer to patients seeking a drug to which they object.  Id. 
 155. See Spreng, supra note 150, at 274 (acknowledging that "[a]s Karen Brauer, 
President of Pharmacists for Life explained it, referring a customer to a colleague who will 
sell Plan B ‘is like saying "I don’t kill people myself but let me tell you about the guy down 
the street who does"’"). 
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women’s interests at stake in medicine dispensation, they also do not have 
policies in place to deal with pharmacists who object to providing birth 
control.156  It is true that their regulations impose an implicit duty to 
dispense contraceptives.157  But whether the regulations actually impose this 
duty is unclear until a conscientious objector-pharmacist tests them.  For 
example, in the incident discussed above a pharmacist in one of these states, 
Ohio, refused to give contraceptives to a customer.158  Only the 
pharmacist’s employer, Wal-Mart, looked into his actions to ensure his 
compliance with the retailer’s store policy.159  In contrast, in another non-
official-policy state, Wisconsin,160 a pharmacist refused to fill or to transfer 
a patient’s birth control prescription.161  There, the Wisconsin Pharmacy 
Examining Board subjected the refusing pharmacist to a disciplinary 
hearing, finding that he had violated the usual standard of care.162  The 
pharmacist received limitations on his license and had to take six hours of 
continuing education in ethics for pharmacy practice.163 
Depending on a pharmacist’s location and the corresponding state laws 
governing his or her actions, the pharmacist’s conscience may feel under 
siege by the law.  A national policy that recognizes this problem would 
allow pharmacists across the country to engage in their profession without 
risking their jobs. 
                                                                                                                 
 156. This number equals the total number of states, less those fourteen states with some 
policy facilitating women’s access to drugs, and those four states with policies protecting 
drug refusals with no concomitant protection for women.  See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 
supra note 15, at 1. 
 157. See MORRISON & BORCHELT, supra note 56, at 4 (concluding that by "omitting 
religious, moral or personal beliefs from the enumerated reasons for refusals, most state 
pharmacy laws implicitly prohibit such refusals"). 
 158. Crane, supra note 61, at A1.  There, the pharmacist refused to provide Plan B to a 
couple after a "contraceptive mishap."  Id. 
 159. See id. (noting that Wal-Mart allows any of its workers to refer customers to 
another pharmacist, pharmacy worker, or sales associate if he or she feels uncomfortable 
dispensing a product).  Wal-Mart corporate spokesman stated that "Wal-Mart is investigating 
the Springfield incident."  Id.  In contrast, the Governor of Ohio, Ted Strickland, explained 
through spokesman Keith Dailey that that he "has no specific plans [regarding the incident] 
but ‘does not believe (pharmacists) should be engaging in that kind of behavior.’"  Id. 
 160. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 1. 
 161. See Mellick, supra note 113, at 412 (describing the story of pharmacist Neil T. 
Noesen who "refused to fill and to transfer a prescription for birth control because he did not 
want to commit a sin"). 
 162. Id. at 428. 
 163. Id. 
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IV.  Framework for a Policy Solution:  Setting the Boundaries 
The ideal public policy solution should further the respective interests 
of women and pharmacists.  Currently, though, the law may favor either 
pharmacists or women at the expense of the other group.164  The law, 
however, also may accommodate both groups’ interests within the broad 
legal boundaries governing women’s and pharmacists’ interests.  A public 
policy addressing access to contraceptives should accommodate both sides 
within the broad boundaries set by the law.165 
A.  Access to Contraceptives Is Not a Positive Right 
States do not have a constitutionally mandated obligation to 
legislate access to contraceptives.  Generally, patients have no clear 
constitutional right to receive affirmative care.166  This fact also means 
that they have no right to affirmative care from a particular health care 
provider.167  The Supreme Court has specifically considered the issue of 
access to contraceptives.168  In holding a state law forbidding the use of 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 33 (discussing in the context of physicians that 
"[c]onscience clauses appear to be neither constitutionally mandated, not constitutionally 
prohibited, leaving state legislature ample room to strike a balance between the interests of 
both physicians and patients").  With regard to the interests of women who oppose strong 
protection for pharmacists, Lynch notes again in the general context of refusal protections 
that "[t]he bottom line is that despite arguments of conscience clause opponents who allege 
that refusers are violating patient rights to access, no such legal right exists."  Id. at 41. 
 165. Similarly, Lynch explains that: 
[T]he legal right’s starting point often used by both sides of the current debate 
does not provide solid, consistent, reliable protection of either party. . . .An 
alternative analysis of legal duties clearly will not get us very far, since if there 
are no legal rights, there are no legal duties. 
Id. at 42.  This Note takes a similar approach, but it instead cites women’s health interests 
and pharmacists’ currently under-protected conscience interests in support of a nationwide 
policy aimed at promoting the interests of both parties.  The purpose of the policy discussion 
presented in this Note is to best advance the interests of both parties within the bounds of the 
law, not to reach a conclusion on whether some alternative source of authority can and 
should guide a solution fit for women and pharmacists.  In contrast, Lynch approaches the 
problem from the perspective of the moral obligations of medical professionals.  Id. 
 166. Id. at 40. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Carey v. Population Serv., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that prohibition 
of the distribution of nonmedical contraceptives to persons over the age of sixteen, except 
through licensed pharmacists, is unconstitutional because it serves no compelling state 
interest); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts statute only 
allowing married couples to obtain contraceptives is unconstitutional under the equal 
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contraceptives unconstitutional, the Court explained in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,169 that the law impermissibly violated a fundamental right 
to privacy encompassed in marriage.170  Later, the Court solidified the 
right to contraceptive access in Eisenstadt v. Baird,171 by extending its 
holding in Griswold to all married or single people.172  The critical point 
is that the Supreme Court’s line of cases on access to birth control 
considered state laws banning access to them.173  In states lacking duty-
to-dispense laws, pharmacists merely have the discretion to refuse to 
give contraceptives based on their conscientious objections.174  Such 
pharmacist refusals do not implicate the state or, in turn, the 
Constitution.175  As author Holly Fernandez Lynch observes, just as 
                                                                                                                 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives 
unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy); see also Cristina Arana 
Lumpkin, Comment, Does a Pharmacist Have the Right to Refuse to Fill a Prescription for 
Birth Control?, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 108–11 (2005) (discussing the Court’s holdings in 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey). 
 169.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (plurality opinion). 
 170. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
 171.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 172. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453, which explains that: 
[If] under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot 
be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally 
impermissible.  It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered 
in the marital relationship.  Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity 
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with 
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.  If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 
 173. The Court, in Griswold, reviewed a law that forbade a person from using any drug 
or other device for preventing conception.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.  The Massachusetts 
law in question in Eisenstadt provided a "maximum five-year term of imprisonment for 
‘whoever . . . gives away . . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the 
prevention of conception[],’" only allowing an exception for married persons.  Eisenstadt, 
405 U.S. at 441. 
 174. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 41 (observing that "health-care professionals have a 
great deal of open space in which to exercise their own consciences even if they have no 
express legal right to do so"). 
 175. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12–13 (1883), which explains that under 
the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[I]nvasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment . . . .  
[U]ntil some state law has been passed, or some state action through its offers or 
agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said 
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into 
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consumers of ordinary goods such as orange juice have no recourse at 
law when a private party legally restricts access through a store closure, 
for example, women have no recourse under the Court’s line of cases 
when pharmacists choose not to dispense contraceptives, 
notwithstanding the Court’s recognition of women’s fundamental rights 
to them.176 
The current state laws regarding pharmacist refusal simply do not 
implicate the Constitution’s aid in facilitating women’s access to 
contraceptives.  Public policy makers should approach the challenge of 
facilitating women’s access to contraceptives with recognition of the 
health and social interests served by these products.177 
B.  The Government Has Wide Latitude in Implementing Laws or 
Regulations Either for or Against Pharmacists’ Consciences 
One factor in favor of pharmacists is that states and the federal 
government have the discretion to enact sweeping conscience 
protections,178 such as those in Mississippi.179  For example, in Chrisman v. 
                                                                                                                 
activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts 
done under State authority. 
See also Lumpkin, supra note 168, at 115 ("A patient who attempts to raise a constitutional 
challenge against a pharmacist who refuses to fill a prescription for oral contraceptives faces 
another hurdle:  The pharmacist’s refusal does not constitute state action, so the patient has 
no private cause of action to assert against the pharmacist."). 
 176. LYNCH, supra note 22, at 40.  Lynch recognizes that the Supreme Court’s first case 
establishing a right to contraceptives, Griswold, establishes no positive right to 
contraceptives, just a "negative right against state laws prohibiting their use or sale."  Id.  
She further explains that: 
[I]f we understand positive rights [as opposed to negative ones like the right to 
contraception, which means to be free from government interference] to impose 
correlating duties or responsibilities on others to ensure that those rights can be 
exercised, then claiming a positive right to all that is legal cannot work.  For 
example, it is legal for you to purchase your favorite orange juice, but if the 
company that manufactures that juice goes out of business or your local grocer 
no longer sells the product, you have not been denied any right, for no one owes 
you any obligation to provide that particular orange juice.  Legality on its own 
simply does not mandate universal availability. 
Id. at 39–40. 
 177. See id. at 33 (concluding in the context on the limits of conscience clauses that the 
real questions are when should a health professional have to yield to patient concerns and 
how should such concerns be addressed). 
 178. See id. at 27 (stressing that conscience protection statutes "are hardly amenable to 
legal attack"). 
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Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace,180  the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit considered a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
federal Church Amendment.181  The appellant challenged the Church 
Amendment provision that prohibited public officials and authorities, as a 
condition of receipt of federal funds, from imposing requirements on health 
care institutions, such as making their facilities available for abortions or 
sterilizations as a violation of the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause.182  The court held that the appellant’s argument lacked merit 
because she failed to prove that the state took action affirmatively 
preferring one religion over another.183  Similarly, the broad pharmacist 
conscience statutes of today feature language like the following: 
No private institution [like a pharmacy] or physician, nor any agent or 
employee [like a pharmacist] of the institution or physician, nor any 
employee of a public institution acting under directions of a physician, 
shall be prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, 
supplies, and information when the refusal is based upon religious or 
conscientious objection.184 
Like the language of the Church Amendment at issue in Chrisman, the 
language of this statute does not support the inference that the state chose to 
prefer one religion over another.185 
On the other hand, states and the federal government do not 
necessarily have to enact sweeping protections in favor of pharmacists.  
Legislators or executive officials can choose to impose dispensation 
requirements186 such as the ones imposed in Maine.187  Such requirements 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2.  Mississippi is one of the 
states that allows all health care providers and institutions to refuse to dispense any drug. 
 180. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000). 
 182. Chrisman, 506 F.2d at 311. 
 183. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff "fail[ed] to distinguish between action taken to 
preserve the ‘government’s neutrality in the face of religious differences’ and action which 
affirmatively prefers one religion over another" (citation omitted)). 
 184. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2009). 
 185. And more importantly, the language of the statute also does not implicate the state 
action requirement necessary to invoke the Establishment Clause.  See Spreng, supra note 
150 (explaining how pharmacist refusals, even though permitted by state law, do not 
constitute action implicating the power of the state). 
 186. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 33 (explaining that "[c]onscience clauses appear to 
be neither constitutionally mandated, nor constitutionally prohibited, leaving state 
legislatures with ample room to strike a balance between the interests of both physicians [or 
pharmacists] and patients"). 
 187. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2.  Maine is one of the states that 
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likely would pass muster under the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause.188  Under the Free Exercise Clause, an individual must comply with 
a law that infringes on religious activity, so long as the law is religiously 
neutral and generally applicable.189  If the law targets a particular religion, 
then a compelling government interest must support it, and it must be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.190  The duty-to-dispense statutes 
against pharmacists employ language such as, "A pharmacist may refuse to 
fill a prescription or dispense a drug only as permitted by 32 M.R.S.A. § 
13795(2) [allowing refusals for reasons such as failure to present a valid 
prescription, but not for reasons of conscience]."191  This language is 
applicable to all pharmacists in all circumstances, no matter their religion, 
so forcing a pharmacist to dispense medications under the statute likely 
would pass muster under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Still, duty-to-dispense rules are not immune from challenge on First 
Amendment grounds.192  A lawsuit in the State of Washington challenging 
                                                                                                                 
require pharmacists to dispense all medicines.  Id. 
 188. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 32, which points out that: 
[C]ourts have generally been less sympathetic to religious freedom claims made 
by those engaged in voluntary commercial activity, such as the practice of 
medicine, as opposed to directly religious activity, since the religious person 
could have theoretically made different professional choices that would not 
burden his or her beliefs at all. 
 189. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 874, 879, 890 (1990) (upholding a 
neutral, generally applicable Oregon state law forbidding the ingestion of peyote as applied 
to two men who ingested peyote for religious reasons, noting that the Oregon Employment 
Division properly denied unemployment benefits from these men because doing so did not 
burden their free exercise rights).  See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (concerning the ritual slaughter of animals).  The rule must be 
neutral by not targeting a particular religion, id. at 532, and it must be generally applicable, 
id. at 542. 
 190. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546 (explaining that "[a] law 
burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the 
most rigorous of scrutiny"). 
 191. 02-392 ME. CODE R. ch. 19, § 11 (West 2009) (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, 
§ 13795 (West 2008)). 
 192. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 30 (discussing a lawsuit currently challenging the 
validity of Washington’s rule requiring pharmacies to dispense lawfully prescribed drugs).  
Another lawsuit is also underway in the State of Illinois challenging its regulations:  Morr-
Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474 (2008).  However, the merits of that lawsuit are 
undeterminable at this time because the Supreme Court of Illinois only has overruled the 
trial court’s dismissal of the pharmacist and pharmacies’ complaint based on procedural 
grounds for failure to show standing, ripeness, and failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  Id. at 474, 490–95. 
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the validity193 of its regulation requiring pharmacies to dispense 
contraceptives.194  In that lawsuit, the plaintiffs obtained a preliminary 
injunction, allowing pharmacies to refuse to dispense the emergency 
contraceptive Plan B if they immediately refer the patient to another source 
of Plan B.195  The court found that the regulations impermissibly targeted 
religious refusers, based on the evolution of the regulations in response to 
religious refusals and on an apparent motivation to target religious 
practices.196  The court also found that the government had not 
demonstrated its interests in increasing access to Plan B or preventing 
gender discrimination as sufficiently compelling interests to support the 
regulation.197  The court’s ruling is certainly questionable,198 in light of the 
neutral language of the regulation at issue.199 
The district court’s conclusions were rejected on appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The history of the 
regulation’s drafting revealed "a patchwork quilt of concerns, ideas, and 
motivations," and the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that religious 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the specifics of 
Washington’s regulation requiring pharmacies to dispense medications). 
 194. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky (Stormans I), 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (W.D. Wash. 
2007) (ruling on the plaintiff pharmacists’ and pharmacy’s motion for preliminary 
injunction). 
 195. Id. at 1266. 
 196. See id. at 1259–63 (discussing the neutrality and general applicability of the 
regulation at issue). 
 197. As to the interest in the access to medications, the court explained that "[t]he 
evidence provided by the parties, including the intervenors [additional people concerned 
about access to Plan B and HIV medications], convinces the Court that the interest promoted 
by the regulations have more to do with convenience and heartfelt feelings than with actual 
access to certain medications."  Id. at 1263.  With respect to the interest in preventing gender 
discrimination, the court explained "[n]or is preventing discrimination on the basis of 
gender, within the context of this case, a compelling state interest . . . .  The plaintiffs’ 
objection to Plan B is not about gender, it is about the sanctity of life as defined by their 
religious teachings."  Id. at 1263–64. 
 198. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 31, which comments that: 
Although the regulations apply to all pharmacists and pharmacies in the state, 
and to all types of prescriptions, the fact that they were explicitly prompted by 
religious refusals to dispensing ‘Plan B’ emergency contraceptives led the court 
to conclude, somewhat questionably, that policymakers acted with the direct 
intent to burden free exercise rights. 
 199. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-869-010(1), (3) (stating that pharmacies must 
either provide the drug or a "therapeutically equivalent drug . . . in a timely manner 
consistent with reasonable expectations for filling the prescription" or provide a "timely 
alternative for appropriate therapy which, consistent with customary pharmacy practice, may 
include obtaining the drug or device"). 
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animus motivated the rule’s promulgation.200  Instead, the court found the 
rule generally applicable.201  The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 
regulation at issue applied broadly because it imposed on "all 
pharmacies . . . a ‘duty to deliver’ all medications ‘in a timely manner.’"202  
Accordingly, the court found that the lower court applied an overly 
stringent review standard and remanded the case for a finding on whether 
the regulation satisfied the rational basis standard.203  The rational basis 
standard uses a low bar, and a law passes the standard if "‘any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts . . . could provide a rational basis for [it].’"204  
Given the significant women’s health issues implicated by access to 
emergency contraceptives and, more generally, the significant health issues 
implicated by access to all prescription medications, courts likely would 
uphold generally applicable laws such as Washington’s under rational basis 
review. 
Other support exists favoring such conscience-based rules.205  The 
New York State Court of Appeals recently upheld a law "requiring all who 
choose to provide insurance coverage for prescription drugs to also provide 
coverage for contraceptives, unless the employer’s organizational purpose 
is to spread religious beliefs, it primarily employs persons sharing those 
beliefs, and it qualifies as a nonprofit organization."206  Many religious 
groups did not qualify for the exception.207  Still, the court emphasized that 
the law was facially neutral and had a primary purpose of improving 
women’s health.208  The fact that the religious groups who objected to the 
law were not required to provide prescription drug coverage at all greatly 
influenced the court.209  The court’s holding reveals that courts are 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky (Stormans II), 586 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 201. Id. at 1137. 
 202. Id. at 1134. 
 203. Id. at 1137–38. 
 204. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’n., Inc., 
508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 
 205. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 31 (emphasizing that the Washington case does not 
support the proposition that service requirements on health professionals are not inherently 
impermissible). 
 206. See id. (discussing Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 
510 (2006)). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. (explaining the "court also relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiffs were 
not required to provide prescription drug coverage at all, so they were not actually required 
to violate their religious beliefs"). 
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generally less amenable to religious freedom claims made by people 
voluntarily engaged in commercial professions.210 
Public policymakers have wide latitude in choosing whether to enact 
statutes facilitating access to contraceptives or protection of pharmacists’ 
conscientious objection.211  Legally, it is not necessary for legislators to 
advance either group’s interests.  However, both groups have important 
personal interests at stake, which public policymakers should not ignore.  
Therefore, the balance of women and pharmacists’ interests in potential 
public policy solutions should control the solutions’ analyses. 
C.  A National Solution Is Feasible 
A national solution is legally feasible.  Congress could pass a law 
under the authority of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.212  The 
nationwide sale of Plan B is certainly an activity that is carried on across 
state lines, and easing the ability of women to obtain these drugs would 
advance a commercial interest.213  Or, Congress or an administrative 
agency, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, could pass 
a law or a regulation, respectively, conditioning the receipt of federal funds 
on compliance with a rule advancing the interests described in this Note.214  
Such an approach would parallel the federal Church Amendment, which 
has used Congress’s financing powers to impose conscience protections for 
health care providers objecting to the provision of abortions or 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id. at 32 (explaining the great importance of recognizing that "the courts have 
generally been less sympathetic to religious freedom claims made by those engaged in 
voluntary commercial activity, since the religious person could have theoretically made 
different professional choices that would not burden his or her beliefs at all"). 
 211. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (introducing Lynch’s criticism of the 
legal rights approach in analyzing conscience clauses in the broader context of conflicts of 
conscience between medical doctors and patients).  As discussed in the footnotes in support 
of Part III, Lynch’s observations in this context support the idea that it is inappropriate to 
assume that a legal rights approach provides a solid foundation for analyzing the conflict 
between women and pharmacists. 
 212. See Lumpkin, supra note 168, at 127 (arguing that Congress could override state 
conscience clauses by promulgating a federal law requiring pharmacists to fill valid, legal 
prescriptions regardless of their individual objections). 
 213. See id. (urging that this kind of statute would be valid under the Commerce Clause 
because contraceptives are distributed nationally through interstate commerce). 
 214. See infra Part IV (discussing the federal conscience regulation). 
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sterilizations.215  Adoption of either method would create a national policy 
addressing the interests of both women and pharmacists. 
IV.  Proposed National-Level Policy Solutions 
A.  Proposed Federal Conscience Regulation 
A public policy solution such as the federal "conscience regulation"216 
proposed by the outgoing Bush administration represents an approach that 
would strongly support pharmacists’ interests.  On December 19, 2008, the 
Bush administration issued a regulation designed to promote the protection 
of health care providers’ consciences.217  Though it came into effect on 
January 20, 2009,218 that same day newly-inaugurated President Barack 
Obama ordered a freeze on all pending regulations from the previous 
administration.219  On February 27, 2009, the Department of Health and 
Human Services served notice that it intended to rescind the regulation.220  
Nonetheless, this regulation could provide a possible public policy solution 
for the future.221 
The regulation requires recipients of federal health care funding, such 
as states through programs such as Medicaid, not to discriminate against 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See discussion supra Part III.B (explaining how the Church Amendment validly 
imposes protections for medical professionals who object to abortions and sterilizations, as a 
condition of receipt of federal funding). 
 216. See David Stout, Move Toward Undoing Rule on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
2009, at A16 [hereinafter Stout, Undoing Rule on Abortion], available at 2009 WLNR 
3900611  ("[C]onsiderable emotion surrounds the issue [of the regulation], as illustrated by 
the shorthand used to describe the rule.  Supporters called it the ‘provider conscience 
regulation,’ while the Planned Parenthood Federation of America disdained it as a ‘midnight 
regulation.’"). 
 217. Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support 
Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 
78,071 (Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Conscience Regulation]. 
 218. Id. at 78,072. 
 219. See David Stout, Obama Takes Oath, and Nation in Crisis Embraces the Moment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Stout, Obama Takes Oath], available at 2009 
WLNR 1150642 (noting that President Obama "ordered all pending Bush regulations frozen 
for a legal and policy review"). 
 220. See Stout, Undoing Rule on Abortion, supra note 216. 
 221. Given the Department’s intent to rescind the regulation, at a bare minimum, the 
regulation will be modified significantly in the near future.  See id. (pointing out that 
"[w]hen the administration publishes official notice of its intent, probably next week, a 30-
day period for public comment will begin, after which the regulation can be repealed or 
modified"). 
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individual health care providers for refusing to provide abortion 
procedures if doing so violates the provider’s religious beliefs or moral 
convictions.222  The regulation fails to specify any definition for the 
term "abortion," implying that the term’s controversial nature defies 
definition but that it nonetheless could still enforce the regulation.223  
Such a reference presumably includes Plan B, which some pharmacists 
believe functions as an abortifacient.224  Groups opposing the 
regulation, such as the National Family Planning and Reproductive 
Health Association, expressed this fear over the regulation, even 
contending that the term "abortion" could encompass regular birth 
control contraceptives, as well.225  Even if the regulations did not, 
another provision still would stymie states from requiring pharmacists 
to dispense medications against their consciences in circumstances 
implicating federal health programs, such as requiring a pharmacist to 
dispense contraceptives to a Medicaid recipient.226 
Such a conscience-focused solution to regulation approximates the 
state regulations that strongly favor pharmacists and furthers objecting 
pharmacists’ interests.  However, merely providing such refusals 
leaves little protection for women.227  Some commentators have 
proposed alternative solutions to remedy such problems. 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,097–98. 
 223. See id. at 78,077 (explaining that the "Department declines to add a definition of 
abortion to the rule. . . . [S]uch questions over the nature of abortion and the ending of a life 
are highly controversial and strongly debated.  The Department believes it can enforce the 
federal health care protection laws without an abortion definition"). 
 224. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 474 (2008) (explaining Mr. 
Vander Bleek’s understanding of Plan B). 
 225. See Complaint of Plaintiff, National Family Planning & Reproductive Health 
Association, Inc. and Fair Haven Community Health Clinic, Inc. v. Michael O. Leavitt, 
Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ¶ 47, 
https://www.aclu.org/pdfs/reproductiverights/nfprhavleavitt_complaint.pdf ("This definition 
[of abortion] could encompass some of the most widely used methods for preventing 
pregnancy, such as birth control pills, emergency contraception, and IUDs because these 
methods occasionally work by interfering with implantation of a fertilized egg in the lining 
of the uterus."). 
 226. See Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,098 (disallowing state actions from 
requiring "any individual to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health 
service program or research activity funded by the Department if such service or activity 
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions"). 
 227. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 33 (urging in the general context of refusal clauses 
that "current conscience clause policy strikes the wrong balance—in fact it offers hardly any 
balance at all, allowing physicians to refuse in too many situations without exception and 
without concern for the patient’s ability to access medical services"). 
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B.  Commentator Proposals 
Commentator proposals have focused on two solutions that could 
ameliorate the concerns of women and pharmacists.  One solution involves 
notice.  Commentators propose providing notice to women about 
pharmacists’ stance toward certain controversial products, such as 
emergency contraceptives.228  This could involve placing a sign at a 
pharmacy, so that women seeking Plan B, for instance, would know to 
avoid pharmacists who are unwilling to dispense the product.229  The other 
major proposal offered by commentators is "transfer-or-refer."230  These 
commentators point to state professionalism standards that would support 
such a compromise.  Under this solution, a pharmacist could avoid the 
unpleasant circumstance of dispensing a contraceptive, yet the woman 
seeking the medication still could obtain it from somewhere else, based on 
the pharmacist’s recommendation.231 
Neither solution fully solves the problem.  Notice proposals merely 
requiring a sign at pharmacies only partly solve the problem of seeking 
access.  A sign at a pharmacy does not stop first-time customers from 
visiting that location, nor does it necessarily tell them where to go if that 
pharmacy does not meet their medical needs.  As for the transfer-and-refer 
solution, pharmacists still face the admittedly unpleasant task of aiding an 
ultimate outcome that is contrary to their beliefs.232 
V.  Potential Policy Solution 
This Note’s policy proposal builds upon the ideas proposed by others 
in order to better serve the interests of both women seeking contraceptives 
and conscientiously objecting pharmacists.  A better way to advance 
women’s and pharmacists’ interests would co-opt the strongest features of 
the currently offered public policy solutions to create a comprehensive set 
of measures that would validate women’s and pharmacists’ interests.  
Federal public policymakers should create a national database of 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See, e.g., Spreng, supra note 150, at 275.  ("A prophylactic means of eliminating 
customer reliance entirely is to make clear from the beginning of the pharmacist’s 
relationship with the customer what the pharmacist will and will not sell."). 
 229. Id. at 275. 
 230. Id. at 274. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. (explaining how some pharmacists object even to referrals for 
contraceptives). 
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pharmacists.233  The database would collect information yearly from all 
pharmacists regarding what products they would sell.  This format 
would avoid potentially controversial questions involving the 
pharmacists’ personal beliefs.  Assembling this data, the federal 
government then should distribute the notices to pharmacies and to 
health care providers, such as physicians.234  The government also 
should publish this information on the internet and in public health 
clinics.  Such measures would ensure a broad distribution.  Moreover, 
the government should make the notices geographically specific, so they 
inform women about the range of pharmacies available nearby to them.  
Through maximizing the amount of information available to women and 
channeling it through several different avenues, this public policy 
solution would do much to absolve the current clash between women 
and pharmacists by directing women away from objecting 
pharmacists.235  Accordingly, the comprehensive notice policy aims to 
                                                                                                                 
 233. Of course, this proposal would be less effective if some pharmacists fail to comply 
with the survey.  If the national policy makes receipt of federal funds contingent on 
compliance, though, states presumably would find a way to comply with the policy, such as 
through their licensing boards.  See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text (identifying 
state laws enabling pharmacy boards to regulate the pharmacy business in their respective 
jurisdictions).  See Suzanne Davis & Paul Lansing, When Two Fundamental Rights Collide 
at the Pharmacy:  The Struggle to Balance the Consumer’s Right to Access Contraception 
and the Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 104 (2009) 
(advocating the creation of databases by state pharmacy boards and dissemination of 
information similar to the approach proposed by the author).  The problem with Davis and 
Lansing’s solution is that it fails to recognize the need for uniform requirements in all states, 
even those with ostensibly stronger protections for women’s access to contraceptives.  As 
advocated by this Note, a women’s access to emergency contraceptives and the protections 
afforded to pharmacists who object to providing them should not vary according to the state 
in which they reside. 
 234. Admittedly, one can assume that some physicians may object to providing 
contraceptives.  However, these physicians probably would not be giving out contraceptive 
prescriptions in the first place.  Therefore, the physicians that would be giving out 
contraceptive prescriptions would give out the notices, too. 
 235. See Spreng, supra note 150, at 275 n.490 (observing that "[o]ne of the intriguing 
developments in the academic literature is that those sympathizing with both the buyer and 
seller in the Plan B squabble lean toward compromises that rely on letting the market work, 
which implies, of course, full information").  The problem with the authorities discussed in 
the literature, though, is that their proposals do not seem to move beyond postings at the 
pharmacy door, which would not go as far as the proposal in this Note goes in promoting full 
information to contraceptive consumers.  Id.  Of course, problems still remain for women 
living in remote areas.  One novel solution proposed in the medical context is to have an 
institution regulate health care access.  LYNCH, supra note 22, at 110–11.  This proposal’s 
broad potential for promoting notice to women would obviate the need to broadly regulate 
pharmacists. 
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prevent conflicts between women and pharmacists by stopping them in 
the first instance. 
The national solution also should address the major weakness in a 
purely notice-based policy.  The problem with a notice-only solution is 
that women in rural areas still may face significant challenges in 
obtaining emergency contraceptives.  Information about nearby 
pharmacies would alert women that the nearest pharmacy that sells 
emergency contraceptives is far away but also would do nothing to 
resolve the challenges they may have in obtaining emergency 
contraceptives.  Using the information gathered regarding the 
availability of emergency contraceptives, state pharmacy boards should 
identify areas that suffer from an acute lack of pharmacists willing to 
dispense emergency contraceptives.236 
After identifying such areas, the boards should ensure that non-
objecting pharmacists are available to women who request emergency 
contraceptives.  With the ever-increasing ease of electronic 
communication, state licensing boards should establish communication 
infrastructures in underserved areas that directly connect patients with 
pharmacists who are willing to distribute emergency contraceptives.237  
These systems could take the form of telephone hotlines staffed by 
local health care professionals, or automated online systems, such as 
kiosks.  With such set-ups in place, off-site pharmacists would only 
need to verify the patient’s identification to confirm that the patient 
meets the age requirement, which is feasible in light of today’s video 
and scanner technology.  Such a solution is especially realistic given 
the federal government’s efforts to facilitate the verification of state 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See LYNCH, supra note 22, at 110–11 (arguing in the medical context that state 
licensing boards should take responsibility for assuring access to controversial health care 
procedures).  Some isolated areas may experience a shortage in pharmacists from a true lack 
of patient demand, so it is unreasonable to expect states to support pharmacists’ employment 
in those areas.  See id. at 190 (illustrating this concept by discussing a scenario in which 
demand in a rural area may be too low to support a full-time abortion provider).  This 
recognition does not preclude pharmacy boards from adopting other measures to facilitate 
women’s access to emergency contraceptives. 
 237. See id. at 185–86 (promoting the use of electronic communication via 
"telemedicine" to bridge the physical distances separating patients and health care 
providers).  Lynch points out that at this point in time, consultative services like those 
involved in the provision of emergency contraceptives are especially appropriate contexts 
for the use of telemedicine.  See id. at 186 (noting that for telemedicine to work beyond 
consultative services and to address physical medical procedures, robotics technology must 
advance). 
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identification materials.238  Similarly, pharmacy boards should allow 
young women with prescriptions for emergency contraceptives to use 
these machines as well.  After a remote pharmacist verifies a woman’s 
identification or prescription, she should be permitted to purchase the 
medication, completely removing an objecting pharmacist from any 
role in providing access to this medication.  A government solution 
connecting women in isolated areas with off-site pharmacists 
facilitates access to Plan B and avoids violating the conscientious 
objections of pharmacists who oppose dispensing the medication. 
VI.  Conclusion 
This Note opened by contrasting the situations of two states with 
sharply differing approaches to handling the clash between women and 
pharmacists with conscientious objections against emergency 
contraceptives.  One state gave strong protections to the women seeking 
contraceptives, to the detriment of pharmacists, whereas the other gave 
strong protections to pharmacists, to the detriment of women.  Neither 
outcome is desirable because both women and pharmacists have valuable 
interests at stake in this debate.  The current mishmash of state attitudes 
toward pharmaceutical access creates a situation in which women and 
pharmacists potentially face sharply contrasting outcomes, depending upon 
where they live.  A national level policy solution is feasible and would 
promote the interests of women and pharmacists, such that the rights of 
neither would be contingent on where a woman or pharmacist lives.  The 
law does not mandate any particular outcome, so the policy can and should 
aim to promote both groups’ interests.  A variety of proposals have been 
offered for a general policy solution, one by the federal government, and 
others by commentators, but none fully ameliorates the potential for 
conflict between women seeking contraceptives and pharmacists.  The 
proposal offered by this Note intends to improve on those policies by 
advocating the dissemination of information to the fullest extent possible by 
the government in order to prevent such clashes at the first instance.  When 
full information cannot overcome barriers to access, the government should 
step in and ensure that women still have access to these medications.  Such 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., Real Progress on Real ID 
(Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2007/12/real-progress-on-real-
id.html (discussing efforts to create a national electronic network to verify state IDs) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
CONCEIVING PLAN B 601 
a comprehensive policy should help resolve much of the conflict arising 
between conscientiously objecting pharmacists and women seeking 
emergency contraceptives. 
  
